

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 USSCC 02880 191903Z  
ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T USSCC GENEVA 2880

EXDIS/SCC-X

E.O.11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: PARM  
SUBJECT: SCC-X PLENARY MEETING, APRIL 19, 1977(SCC-X-040)

1. USTINOV MADE LENGTY STATEMENT ON "TESTED IN AN ABM MODE" KSEPTEL) IN RESPONSE TO US STATEMENTS OF MARCH 25, APRIL 7, 13 AND 15 ON SAME SUBJECT. HE CITED MUTUAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF SIDES THAT PROVISIONS OF ABM TREATY RELATED TO "TESTED IN ANABM MODE" APPLY TO TESTING AFTER DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY AND NOT TO EARLIER TESTING, AND THAT ABM COMPONENTS SIDES HAD BEFORE THAT DATE ARE COVERED BY PHRASE ZCONSTRUCTED AND DEPLOYED FOR AN ABM ROLE." IN TORTURED FASHION HE AGREED WITH US POSITION THAT RADAR, NOT TESTED IN ABM MODE AT TEST RANGE, ALSO BECOMES ABM RADAR WHEN, DURING ITS CONSTRUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT IN PERMITTED DEPLOYMENT AREA, IT IS APPROPRIATELY TESTED. HE ADDED THAT SIDES HAVE ALWAYS AGREED THAT TESTING IS PART OF DEVELOPMENT PROCESS. USTIJOV CLAI ED THAT US STATEMENTS, PARTICULARLY THAT OF APRIL 13, CONTAINED INCORRECT INTERPRETATIONS OF SOVIET VIEWS ON "TESTED IN AN ABM MODE." HE STATED THAT SOVIET SIDE STRICTLY COMPLIES WITH ART. VI(A) OF THE TREATY; THEREFORE, THERE CAN BE NO ARGUMENT ABOUT THE "PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY" OF TESTING NON-ABM COMPO-  
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NENTS IN ANABM MODE SINCE SUCH TESTING WOULD BE A VIOLATION. IN SOVIET VIEW ART. VI PROHIBITS SUCH TESTING AND, IF ONE SIDE "SUCCUMBS TO TEMPTATION" AND EXERCISES "PHYSICAL POSSIBILITY" OF SUCH TESTING, IT WILL BE IN VIOLATION OF TSREATY. USTINOV ADDED THAT THE ACTUAL INTERCEPT OF A STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR AN INTERCEPTOR MISSILE TO CON-

SIDERED TO HAVE BEEN "TESTED IN AN ABM MODE." IN THIS REGARD, HE REAFFIRMED STATEMENT MADE IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION TO BUCHHEIM ON APRIL 13 (SEE SCC-X-036). USTINOV DISAGREED WITH US VIEW THAT INTERCEPTOR MISSILES ARE COMPONENTS "TESTED IN AN ABM MODE" BASED ON THE ALTITUDE TO WHICH THEY ARE TESTED. HE RESTATED SOVIET POSITION THAT SUCH A CONCLUSION MUST BE BASED ON TESTING AN INTERCEPTOR MISSILE, GUIDED BY AN ABM RADAR, AGAINST A STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE. IN RESPONSE TO BUCHHEIM'S QUESTION OF APRIL 15, USTINOV NOTED THAT EACH SIDE HAD A FREE CHOICE OF "INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT" NECESSARY TO MAKE MEASUREMENTS ON STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES DURING REENTRY, INCLUDING AIR DEFENSE RADARS, AS LONG AS THEY DO NOT TRACK OR GUIDE INTERCEPTOR MISSILES.

2. BUCHHEIM IN FIRST OF TWO STATEMENTS (SEPT-1) INFORMED SOVIETS THAT US SIDE PREPARED TO REMOVE WORD "FLIGHT" IN ITS DEFINITION OF "TEST RANGES" IF SOVIET SIDE CAN AFFIRM AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE GENERAL MEANING CONVEYED BY THE WORD "FLIGHT" AS USED BY US. IN STATEMENT ON UTILIZATION OF AIR DEFENSE RADARS AT "TEST RANGES," BUCHHEIM CITED AREAS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES CONCERNING UTILIZATION OF AIR DEFENSE RADARS AT ABM TEST RANGES IN PERFORMANCE OF APPROPRIATE AIR DEFENSE FUNCTIONS AND ON PROHIBITION OF USE OF AIR DEFENSE RADARS TO MAKE MEASUREMENTS ON, OR TO GUIDE, ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILES. HE NOTED THAT SIDES MAY BE IN AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE USE OF SUCH RADARS TO ASSURE SAFETY

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OF AIRCRAFT OVER AND NEAR A TEST RANGE. IN ADDITION, HE TOOK ISSUE WITH SOVIET VIEW CONCERNING USE OF AIR DEFENSE RADARS FOR INSTRUMENTATION, NOTING THAT A SPECIAL-PURPOSE RADAR AT TEST RANGE USED AS INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT HAS NARROW IMPLICATIONS; HOWEVER, SUCH USE OF AN AIR DEFENSE RADAR OF A TYPE THAT IS PROLIFERATED ACROSS NATIONAL TERRITORY OF EITHER OF THE PARTIES FOR THE SAME FUNCTION WOULD RAISE QUESTIONS REGARDING ART. I. HE REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF SOVIET USE OF THE PHRASE "IN INDIVIDUAL CASES" IN THEIR STATEMENT OF APRIL 15 THAT AIR DEFENSE RADARS UTILIZED AT TEST RANGES AS INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT MAY BE USED IN INDIVIDUAL CASES DURING TESTING OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES OR THEIR ELEMENTS FOR MAKING MEASUREMENTS DURING REENTRY INTO THE ATMOSPHERE. IN CONCLUSION, BUCHHEIM RESTATED US VIEW THAT AIR DEFENSE RADARS SHOULD NOT BE USED TO MAKE RADAR MEASUREMENTS ON STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES OR THEIR ELEMENTS IN FLIGHT TRAJECTORY, OR ON ANY TARGET WITH TRAJECTORY CHARACTERISTICS OF A

STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE.BUCHHEIM

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## Message Attributes

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